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Random‑telegraph‑noise‑enabled 
true random number generator 
for hardware security
James Brown1*, Jian Fu Zhang1*, Bo Zhou1, Mehzabeen Mehedi1, Pedro Freitas1, 
John Marsland1 & Zhigang Ji2*
The future security of Internet of Things is a key concern in the cyber‑security field. One of the key 
issues is the ability to generate random numbers with strict power and area constrains. “True Random 
Number Generators” have been presented as a potential solution to this problem but improvements 
in output bit rate, power consumption, and design complexity must be made. In this work we 
present a novel and experimentally verified “True Random Number Generator” that uses exclusively 
conventional CMOS technology as well as offering key improvements over previous designs in 
complexity, output bitrate, and power consumption. It uses the inherent randomness of telegraph 
noise in the channel current of a single CMOS transistor as an entropy source. For the first time multi‑
level and abnormal telegraph noise can be utilised, which greatly reduces device selectivity and offers 
much greater bitrates. The design is verified using a breadboard and FPGA proof of concept circuit 
and passes all 15 of the NIST randomness tests without any need for post‑processing of the generated 
bitstream. The design also shows resilience against machine learning attacks performed by the LSTM 
neural network.
Cyber-security is a key concern and grows in importance as the Internet of things (IoT) takes root, where bil-
lions of devices will be connected across the  globe1. The necessity to secure all of these devices requires novel 
approaches to traditional problems in the cyber-security domain as existing techniques are not viable for the 
new challenges presented by many of these IoT  devices2. One such problem is the need for random numbers 
which are essential for secure communication between  devices3. Traditional methods for random number crea-
tion rely upon harvesting entropy from some environmental factor such as circuit noise or user input and use 
this as a seed for a pseudo-random number  algorithm4. These traditional methods are now under huge strain 
as the ultra-low power and device area in typical IoT edge units don’t possess the computing power required by 
the traditional methods. This is also compounded by another problem where machine learning attacks are now 
able to crack and predict the output from the traditional pseudo-random  algorithms5. A potential solution to 
this problem is to directly extract entropy from a natural phenomenon and converts it to random numbers. This 
type of design is commonly referred to as “True Random Number Generator” (TRNG), although it should point 
out that no amount of statistical analysis can confirm that a generator is truly random. Many TRNG designs have 
been proposed that make use of a wide range of entropy sources, but none have yet been widely accepted as a 
solution for security concerns. One of the first entropy sources was thermal noise either extracted directly from 
a  resistor6 or through its effect on digital circuits such as the introduction of clock-jitter or meta-stability7–22. 
The weaknesses of the thermal noise-based designs are its sensitivity to noise-based attacks, compromising the 
randomness of the output, as well as issues with the design complexity required for post-processing and tuning of 
the  system10,23–26. Many other entropy sources have been used for TRNGs, such as the timing of time dependent 
dielectric breakdown (TDDB)27,  Photonics28–31, and current variation or switching time of emerging technologies 
such as  ReRAM32–34. TDDB-based designs suffer from high complexity of circuit design and processing circuits 
which limit their use in low-area, low-power applications. The efficient and secure quantum based TRNGs have 
been  demonstrated35, but different applications will use different types of TRNGs in the future.
Another entropy source that has shown promise is random telegraph noise (RTN). RTN is a phenomenon 
observed in scaled CMOS devices caused by the capture and emission of charge carriers from the conduction 
channel to traps within the gate dielectric that results in variation of the threshold voltage and channel current 
over  time36. The variation in the capture and emission time can be extracted and used as an entropy source. 
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Several RTN-based TRNG designs have been proposed, however all have drawbacks of low speed, complex tun-
ing requirements, complex post-processing, vulnerability to over-sampling attacks, or the need for large device 
arrays to find a device with suitable RTN to be used as an entropy  source37–40.
In this work, we present a novel TRNG design using a new approach to RTN extraction and processing which 
overcomes the weaknesses of RTN based TRNGs mentioned above. The proposed design makes use of a new 
edge-to-pulse scheme which enables, for the first time, multi-level and abnormal RTN to be used to increase 
speed and to reduce device selectivity. We also use a new processing technique where the pulses from the edge-
to-pulse circuit are used to sample an oscillator, removing the need for complex post-processing and for tuning 
of the sampling rate, as well as increasing resistance to over-sampling attacks. The proposed design passes the 
15 NIST Special Publication 800-22 randomness  tests41 which is the industry standard tests for TRNG random-
ness. The whole design is verified experimentally, with a proof of concept circuit using a CMOS transistor as 
the entropy source, the edge-to-pulse circuit built on breadboard, and the processing circuit implemented on 
an FPGA.
Results
RTN in nano‑scale CMOS transistors. RTN is caused by traps, which are the electrical-active defects 
within the gate dielectric of nano-scaled devices. These defects can be formed during fabrication of the device or 
generated through electrical and thermal  stressing42. Previously, when researchers explored RTN as an entropy 
source for a TRNG, only two-level RTN is considered. This type of RTN is shown in Fig. 1a where a constant gate 
(Vg) and drain (Vd) voltage are applied and two clear levels can be observed in the measured drain current (Id). 
However, it is often the case that more than one trap is present in a given device, resulting in an RTN signal with 
more than 2 visible levels, This is referred to as multi-level  RTN43 and one example is given in Fig. 1b, where we 
can observe 4 clear levels in the Id. When 4 clear levels can be observed, there are 2 active traps influencing the 
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Figure 1.  Major different types of RTN observed in measurement of individual transistors of the same design 
and size. (a) An example of two-level RTN, the most well studied type of RTN utilised by traditional RTN based 
TRNGs. Two-level RTN is caused by a single dominating trap within the measured device. (b) An example of 
multi-level RTN, a more complex RTN signal which cannot be used by traditional RTN based TRNGs but can 
be used by our newly presented TRNG design. Multi-level RTN is caused by multiple active traps being present 
within the measured device. (c) An example of abnormal RTN, the most complex type of RTN discussed here. 
Abnormal RTN could not be used in traditional designs and could cause major issues such as oversampling. 
With our new design abnormal RTN can be used without issue. Abnormal RTN is caused by dominating traps 
causing other traps to be obscured when the dominating trap is in one particular state or another.
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channel current. It is possible to have more traps active, although in nano-scale devices it is rare to have more 
than a few clearly discernible traps. The number of traps present is proportional to device area and the single trap 
impact is inversely proportional to  it44,45. It is also often observed that RTN is not always consistent where some 
traps may only be active when a dominating trap is in a certain  state46. This can result in Id measurements like 
or similar to Fig. 1c where there is clearly a slower trap and a faster trap, but the faster trap is only active when 
the slow trap is in the empty state.
TRNG design utilising multi‑level RTN. The TRNG presented in this work has three major parts. The 
first part is the entropy source which is a single nano-scale transistor with a constant Vg and Vd applied to it, 
whose Id current is amplified so that it can be used as an input to the edge-to-pulse circuit. The second major 
section of the TRNG circuit is the edge-to-pulse circuit which is used to perform the analogue to digital conver-
sion where the amplified RTN signal is converted to digital pulses that can be used as an input to the processing 
circuit. The final part of the circuit is the processing circuit, which converts the digital pulses to random numbers 
through the sampling of a high frequency oscillator. The processing circuit also acts as a bridge between the 
asynchronous random number generation and any synchronous circuit it is attached to.
Edge‑to‑Pulse circuit. The edge-to-pulse circuit takes an amplified RTN signal and converts the trapping 
and de-trapping events into short pulses. These short pulses can then be used by the processing circuit to gener-
ate random numbers based upon the timing interval of these events. The edge-to-pulse circuit consists of three 
sub-circuits.
The first of these sub-circuits is a differentiator that converts the RTN trapping and de-trapping events into 
positive and negative voltage spikes respectively as seen in Fig. 2a,b. It is important that the differentiator circuit 
is biased so that no edges give a constant output voltage of 0. This 0 V no edge output is set so that differentiated 
de-trapping events will give a negative voltage spike which is required for the next absolute value sub-circuit. In 
our proof of concept circuit, this 0 V bias was achieved with a variable resistor connected to the non-inverting 
terminal supplied with − 5 V. In a commercial product this would be replaced with a fixed resistor as the expected 
Id current from the entropy source for the given Vg and Vd would be known.
The second sub-circuit is the absolute value circuit seen in Fig. 2c,d. It converts the negative spikes from the 
differentiated de-trapping events into positive spikes so that they can be digitised by the same comparator. The 
gain of the absolute value circuit can be greater than 1 if required, but in our experimental case it is left at unity 
as no further amplification was required for the spikes to be of sufficient magnitude as input for the comparator.
The final sub-circuit shown in Fig. 2e,f is a comparator which is used to convert the analogue spikes from 
the absolute value circuit to digital pulses which can be used as an input to the processing section of the TRNG. 
Figure 2.  Edge-to-pulse circuit diagram and example outputs. (a) Circuit diagram of differentiator used to 
convert RTN edges to voltage spikes. (b) Example output signal from differentiator for the given input RTN 
signal, edges converted to positive and negative spikes. (c) Circuit diagram of absolute value circuit used to 
convert positive and negative differentiator spikes to all positive spikes. (d) Example output signal from absolute 
value circuit for the given RTN input. All voltage spikes are now positive. (e) Circuit diagram of comparator 
used to convert voltage spikes from absolute value circuit to digital pulses that can be used as input to the FPGA. 
(f) Example output from comparator circuit for given RTN input, spike has been converted to square pulse.
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Figure 3 shows the output with a multi-level RTN input. The comparator is set to give a 0 V or 3 V output for 
low and high levels which is the required by the I/O of the FPGA used for the processing section. The reference 
voltage for the comparator input is set to be slightly higher than the background noise of the absolute value 
circuit so that all RTN event spikes will be digitised. The complete breadboard implementation of the edge-to-
pulse circuit is shown in Fig. 4.
Processing circuit implemented on a FPGA. The second major part of our TRNG design is the process-
ing circuit where the digitised pulses from the edge-to-pulse circuit are used to generate random numbers, the 
complete block diagram of this part of the TRNG is shown in Fig. 5. The processing circuit itself can be split into 
three sub-circuits. The first two sub-circuits for sampling and data buffering are essential for random number 
generation. The third sub-circuit is used for transmission of the generated numbers to an external analysis PC 
which is used for result verification. To perform the data transmission, the RS232 UART communication on the 
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Figure 3.  Output of comparator for given RTN input signal to edge-to-pulse module. Output of comparator 
has a magnitude of 3 V making it a suitable input for the FPGA. The comparator output is triggered on both the 
edges of the large slower trap and the smaller faster trap, showing our design can make use of multi-level RTN. 
Some of the edges of the small trap can be missed, however, as the magnitude of the trap is very close to the 
background noise.
Figure 4.  Photograph of Edge-to-pulse circuit, implemented on breadboard, including differentiator, absolute 
value, and comparator circuits. Amplified RTN signal is used as input to this circuit and the comparator output 
is sent to processing FPGA.
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FPGA development board was used. The requirements of the RS232 communication governed the selection of 
the 8-bit words of random numbers that were created in the first two sub-circuits, as well as the maximum data 
transfer rate of 19,200 bps, which is limited by the maximum clock speed of the FPGA. Without the limitations 
of the RS232 communication these variables could be changed to fit the requirements of the given application.
The sampling sub-circuit contains two key components, the first of these is a D-Flip-flop which is used to 
asynchronously sample an oscillator (in this case the clock of the FPGA) whenever a rising pulse edge is received 
from the edge-to-pulse circuit. To achieve the sampling, the oscillator is connected to the D-input of the flip-flop 
and the output of the edge-to-pulse circuit is connected to the clock input of the flip-flop. The output ‘Q’ will 
update to whatever value the oscillator was at when the rising edge of the pulse was received. The second key 
component in this section is a trigger module that is used to ensure each pulse from the edge-to-pulse circuit 
only results in one value being written into the data buffering section. This is achieved by the trigger module 
having both the FPGA clock and the edge-to-pulse output connected as inputs. Every time a pulse rising edge 
is received from the edge-to pulse circuit the trigger unit will output a pulse that has a duration of a single clock 
cycle of the FPGA clock. This single clock cycle pulse can then be used as an enable signal in other parts of the 
circuit that are required to be synchronous.
The data buffering sub-circuit is used to buffer the random numbers that are generated at an asynchronous 
non-constant rate so that they can be read at a constant synchronous rate. In our proof of concept circuit, it 
also converts the single generated random bits into 8-bit random words so they can be transmitted following 
the RS232 communication scheme. The first important module of the data buffering sub-circuit is the serial-
to-parallel converter. For the proof of concept circuit this module converts eight serial input random numbers 
to a single parallel 8-bit random word which can then be sent to the first in first out (FIFO) buffer. The second 
key module is a counter which outputs a single pulse for every eight input pulses from the trigger module of the 
sampling sub-circuit. This counter is used to control the transmission of data from the serial to parallel converter 
to the FIFO buffer. The data buffering sub-circuit also contains a trigger module that is the same as in the sam-
pling sub-circuit. This second trigger module is used to ensure that the output from the counter is a pulse that 
only lasts for a single clock pulse of the FPGA. This is important to ensure that when data is transferred from the 
serial to parallel converter and then to the FIFO buffer, it is only transferred once per 8-bit word.
The final key module in the data buffering sub-circuit is the FIFO buffer, the main purpose of this module is 
to allow the random words to be read from the TRNG at a different rate from that which they are generated at. 
This concept is key as the random bits are generated at the rate of the RTN events whereas any application using 
these numbers can use them at a rate dictated by the application’s requirements. The depth of the FIFO buffer 
can also be adjusted depending on the application’s requirements. The FIFO buffer will write in the random 
number sent from the serial to parallel converter every time an enable pulse is received from the data buffering 
trigger module. When the FIFO is full, data won’t be written in and instead will be discarded. The FIFO buffer 
will output a random 8-bit word every time an enable signal is received from the transmission sub-circuit unless 
the FIFO buffer is empty in which case nothing will be transmitted.
The transmission sub circuit is used to transmit the random 8-bit words from the data buffering sub-circuit 
to an external analysis PC. In practice this sub-circuit is not required for TRNG operation, but it is used here 
in our proof of concept circuit so analysis such as the NIST tests could be performed. The first key module in 
the data transmission circuit is the baud generator, which divides the FPGA clock signal down by 16 times to 
give a baud rate for the RS232 UART communication. The second key module is the UART transmitter, this 
is a module that follows the RS232 communication scheme and has the maximum data transfer rate is 19,200 
bps for the used FPGA. This maximum data transfer rate is the bottleneck for our proof of concept circuit. The 
Figure 5.  Block diagram of FPGA section of the proof of concept TRNG. This block diagram was used for 
the visual programming part of the FPGA implementation. Each block is created using VHDL programming, 
with the Debias and Trigger modules being custom code and the other modules created using conventional 
designs. This block diagram shows all 3 key parts of the FPGA design, which are the sampling, buffering, and 
transmission circuits.
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TRNG itself can generate random bits at much faster rate, the maximum of which is limited by the slew rate of 
the op-amps in the edge-to-pulse circuit.
Sampling oscillator parameters. The parameters for the oscillator are key for the proposed TRNG to 
work properly and output unbiased random numbers. The key parameters are the frequency of oscillation, and 
duty factor.
For the frequency of oscillation, the key point is that the frequency should be high enough that the signal is 
not sampled multiple times by the RTN before switching state. If the oscillator is too slow and sampled multiple 
times before switching, the output will contain long chains of the same bit which lowers entropy and causes the 
bitstream to be non-random. Figure 6 shows a simulation of a TRNG with multiple RTN traps with fixed capture 
times (τc) and emission times (τe) operating across a range of oscillator frequencies. The bitrate remains almost 
constant as this is controlled by the RTN event timing. When the oscillator frequency is reduced below  Foscmin, 
however, the generated bits start to fail the Runs Test for randomness.  Foscmin is defined by Eq. (1) where n is the 
number of traps present in the entropy source. To act as a rule of thumb when choosing an oscillator frequency, 
it should be selected to be as high as possible without violating the other key parameters as any frequency above 
 Foscmin will give the same results.
For the duty factor of the oscillator the key point is that it should be kept as close to 50% as possible. This is 
because a duty factor significantly different to 50% will result in a bias of the output bitstream to either ‘0’ or ‘1’. 
Figure 7 shows the relationship between duty factor of oscillator and the Shannon entropy of the output bitstream. 
Shannon entropy is used to check if there is any bias towards one value. For a system with two possible outputs, 
the ideal result for Shannon entropy is ‘1’. Any reduction from this represents a reduction in the randomness of 
the results. To find the maximum allowable error in the duty factor away from 50% the NIST test suite was used 
to test bitstreams generated from a simulated TRNG over a range of duty factors. It was found that the maximum 
variation away from 50% that would still pass all 15 NIST tests was 6%. If the oscillator has duty factor that is 
not ideal but has a consistent frequency greater than double  Foscmin the duty factor can be improved by use of 
an extra debias module. This module takes the unbalanced oscillator as the input and toggles the output every 
time a rising edge is detected in the input. This follows the debiasing scheme outlined in  reference39.
Bitstream analysis and NIST test results. To verify the randomness of the generated bitstreams, they 
were transmitted to an external analysis PC. On the analysis PC, bitstreams were divided up into blocks whose 
sizes are defined by the guidelines provided in the instruction manual for the NIST test  suite41 (see more details 
in the “Methods” section) and all 15 NIST tests were run. The significance value for our NIST tests was set to 
0.01 which is the recommended value from NIST. For the tests excluding the non-overlapping template match-
ing, random excursions, and random excursions variant, multiple blocks of random numbers are tested, and a 
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Figure 6.  Output bitrate and Runs Test result against the frequency of the oscillator being sampled by the 
RTN edge pulses. The Runs Test is used to find runs of ‘1’ or ‘0’ and determines whether a run of the same 
result that number of times is acceptable in a bitstream of the given length, based on a null hypothesis theory 
with a significance value of 0.01. The Runs Test gives a result of ‘1’ if it passes and a ‘0’ if it fails, a fail indicates 
oversampling of the oscillator by the RTN signal causing long chains of the same result. The RTN signal 
simulated for this test uses 5 traps with τc and τe values extracted from characterisation of real traps. Both 
the rising and trailing edges of the RTN signal were used for sampling giving and  Foscmin of 1.21E + 5 Hz. 
The minimum frequency that could pass the Runs Test was 8.6E + 4 Hz and the output bitrate was fixed at 
122,800 bps.
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proportion defined by NIST must pass the test for the bitstream to be considered random. For the three tests that 
don’t require multiple blocks tested, the individual P-value is used to determine success or failure. The bitstreams 
from our TRNG have passed all 15 NIST tests without post-processing as shown in Table 1. Our generated bit-
stream was also tested by using the DIEHARD test  suite47, as detailed in the “Methods” section. The DIEHARD 
tests work on the same null-hypothesis theorem as the NIST tests, so that we kept the same significance value 
of 0.01 for determining P-value success or failure. The results of the DIEHARD tests are shown in Table 2. Our 
design was able to pass all of the available DIEHARD tests, giving a great confidence in the truly random nature 
of our generated bitstream. To further illustrate the randomness of our generated bitstream, a sample set of 146 k 
bits were used to create a bitmap in Fig. 8, where no clear patterns can be seen, confirming the randomness of 
the bitstream.
Resistance to machine learning attacks. To test how our TRNG would resist machine learning attacks 
and further improve confidence in the security of the TRNG, we tested some of our generated bitstreams with 
an LSTM neural network. LSTM networks have been shown to be able to predict some random number genera-
tor outputs, even if the RNG passes all of the NIST  tests48. We used 1 million generated bits for testing with the 
LSTM network (see details in the “Methods” section) and tried to predict future bits that will be generated by the 
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Figure 7.  Shannon entropy of output bitstream when RTN signal is used to sample oscillators of different duty 
factors. Shannon entropy is used to measure the ratio of ‘0’ bits to ‘1’ bits. A Shannon entropy of ‘1’ indicates 
a 50% of any selected bit being ‘0’ or ‘1’. A Shannon entropy less than 1 is caused by a bias in the bitstream to 
either ‘0’ or ‘1’, indicating that the bitstream is not random. A 100 kb bitstream was generated at each data point 
to be tested. 9 NIST tests were done on these bitstreams to find the largest error from 50% duty factor that could 
pass. When the largest error that could pass 9 NIST tests was found, a 3 Mb bitstream was generated with that 
error to verify the results with all 15 NIST tests.
Table 1.  NIST Test suite results for bitstream generated by our TRNG design with a significance value of 0.01.
Test ID Name Proportion Pass/fail
T1 Monobit test 99/100 Pass
T2 Frequency tests within a block 100/100 Pass
T3 Cumulative sums test 96/100 Pass
T4 Run test 99/100 Pass
T5 Longest run of ones in a block 98/100 Pass
T6 Discrete fourier transform test 49/50 Pass
T7 Non-overlapping template matching n/a Pass
T8 Approximate entropy test 96/100 Pass
T9 Serial test 100/100 Pass
T10 Binary matrix rank 99/100 Pass
T11 Overlapping template matching 8/10 Pass
T12 Universal 8/10 Pass
T13 Linear complexity 10/10 Pass
T14 Random excursions n/a Pass
T15 Random excursions variant n/a Pass
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TRNG. After training the LSTM network was only able to predicts the bits of our TRNG output with an accuracy 
of 49.81%, which is very close to the ideal value of 50% that could be achieved through random guessing. This 
shows that our design is resilient against machine learning based attacks and further increases confidence in the 
random nature of the output.
Discussion
Previously proposed RTN based TRNGs could not extract the full entropy from multi-level or abnormal RTN. 
They rely upon finding a device from a large array that fits the ideal requirements of the  TRNG37. These ideal 
devices can be very rare, resulting in large TRNG footprint as many devices have to be included in the array 
as well as complicated tuning and selection circuits to identify and select the ideal device. In our new design 
the ability to use devices that have multi-level or abnormal RTN vastly increases the chances that a device will 
be suitable for use in a TRNG. This means that the size of array required for potential entropy sources can be 
Table 2.  DIEHARD test results.
Test ID Name P-Value Pass/Fail
T1 Birthday spacings test 0.87125 Pass
T2 Overlapping permutations 0.98398 Pass
T3 Rank of matrices 0.56833 Pass
T4 Bitstream test 0.72978 Pass
T5 Count-the-1’s stream test 0.36753 Pass
T6 Count-the-1’s byte test 0.22222 Pass
T7 Parking lot test 0.94059 Pass
T8 Minimum distance test 0.12461 Pass
T9 3D spheres test 0.12013 Pass
T10 Squeeze test 0.55082 Pass
T11 Overlapping sums test 0.16278 Pass
T12 Runs test 0.95088 Pass
T13 Craps test 0.35721 Pass
T14 Random excursions n/a Pass
T15 Random excursions variant n/a Pass
Figure 8.  Bitmap showing the first 146 k bits of the generated bitstream from the TRNG proof of concept 
circuit. There are no clear repeating patterns, large blocks or lines of a single colour, and an even balance of black 
and white within the bitmap, which illustrates to the eye that the sequence is random, further supporting the 
results from the NIST test suite.
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reduced to fewer than 10 devices. There is further benefit to using multi-level RTN in terms of output bit rate. In 
traditional designs where multi-level RTN might be present, the device is still usable if one trap is significantly 
larger than the other. In this case, only the entropy from this largest trap, however, was extracted. With our 
design, we can extract entropy from all of the traps. This allows us to utilise many more RTN events in a given 
time frame compared to a traditional design.
The new processing scheme proposed in this work gives us several key advantages over previous works. The 
first one is the removal of the complicated tuning of a sampling clock frequency. In traditional designs, the sam-
pling clock frequency must be heavily correlated with the capture and emission times of the device being used 
as an entropy source in order to maintain a high output bitrate, while also avoiding oversampling of the entropy 
source. As the capture and emission times of a given device are unknown and can have a large device to device 
variation, the selection of a sampling clock frequency is complicated as it has to match a specific device before 
manufacture or the TRNG must have a complex self-tuning mechanism that will greatly increase design complex-
ity and power consumption. With our proposed TRNG design the RTN events are used to do the sampling, so 
that no tuning is needed as long as the oscillator being sampled is running at a higher frequency than the RTN 
events. This sampling technique also makes our design immune to over-sampling attacks which has been known 
to be an issue for previous  TRNGs26, where a higher frequency signal is imposed on top of the sampling clock 
to oversample the RTN signal and give long chains of ‘1’ or ‘0’. It is important to note that our design would be 
susceptible to under-sampling attacks which would give the same effect as oversampling for a traditional design. 
It is more difficult, however, to remove edges from the oscillator signal, without having direct access to the oscil-
lator itself, than to add extra edges to a signal by simply applying an additional signal on top of it.
Another key advantage of the new processing scheme is that it removes the need for complicated post-
processing. In traditional designs, Von Neumann or ORing post-processing were the most popular techniques to 
remove bias from the  output10. These techniques require large complex circuits to implement and reduce TRNG 
throughput. More recently new post-processing techniques have been proposed that use a toggling output for 
each input rising edge from the entropy  source39. This greatly reduces the circuit complexity, but it also greatly 
reduces the bitrate of the design. With our new technique no post-processing is required, as long as the sampling 
oscillator has a duty factor between 44% of 56%.
The current bitrate of our TRNG is limited to 19,200 bps by the requirements of the RS232 communication. 
For practical applications, this transmission circuit is not required so this limitation on the maximum bitrate 
would be removed. With the data transmission bitrate limit removed the next limiting factor is the slew rate of 
the op-amps used in the edge-to-pulse module. With the currently selected components the slew rate allows us 
to achieve a bitrate of ~ 10 Mbps. If the speed of the RTN exceeds the slew rate of the op-amps, then the differ-
entiator will not complete its transition for each RTN event and will give an ambiguous output. This ambiguous 
output is maintained above the reference voltage of the comparator. As the input voltage to the comparator is 
always above the reference value, the TRNG will not generate random numbers. However, in our work the RTN 
found has not had time constants capable of generating bits at a rate higher than a few Mbps which is well below 
the maximum slew rate of the op-amps used.
The speed of the RTN events ultimately governs the bitrate of the TRNG. At the current bitrate limit of 19,200 
bps it is very common to have RTN which is capable of generating bits at this rate. As the bitrate increases to a 
level that the rate of the RTN events becomes the limiting factor, there are several options available to increase 
the TRNG throughput. The first option is to find a device with faster RTN events. As mentioned earlier RTN 
event rate has a large device to device variation. Some devices may be capable of generating TRNGs with a bitrate 
in the Mbps  range49 while other can only achieve a few kbps. In our measurements it is common to find devices 
that have traps whose time constants are in the microsecond range. Using one of these traps would allow for a 
maximum random bit generation rate of ~ 1 Mbps. In practice all TRNGs could be tested after manufacture and 
have their throughput rated accordingly so a consumer can select a TRNG with a suitable speed for their given 
application. Another option for increasing throughput is to use an AC RTN scheme for the voltages applied to 
the entropy source device. An AC RTN scheme has been shown to be capable of increasing the observed rate 
of RTN events by thousands of  times38. The downside to using this AC RTN scheme is an increase in design 
complexity. The final option for increasing throughput is to have multiple devices used in parallel as the entropy 
source, doing this could massively increase the bitrate. As for the AC RTN, having multiple devices as the entropy 
source increases design complexity so it should be avoided if not necessary for a given application.
Another factor to consider for TRNG operation is the temperature effect on the TRNG. The key effect of 
temperature on the proposed TRNG is its effect upon the rate of RTN events. The effect of temperature on the 
capture and emission times of RTN traps has been studied in some  detail50. It is known that typically an increase 
in temperature will decrease both the capture and emission times of an RTN trap. For our TRNG higher tem-
perature will increase bitrate. In terms of security, these variations will not affect the randomness of the generated 
bitstream thanks to the RTN sampling oscillator scheme. The only time security that could be compromised is 
if the RTN is accelerated to such an extent that it surpasses  Foscmin and the RTN starts oversampling the oscil-
lator. To avoid this, Fosc should be selected to be sufficiently above the maximum possible rate that RTN could 
be accelerated by raising temperature.
A further consideration for the parameters related to the entropy source is the voltage applied to it, namely Vg 
and Vd. For the entropy source devices used in this work the, the minimum applied Vg should be 0.42 V, which 
is close to threshold voltage and gives a sufficient drain current for measurement. The maximum Vg is 1.2 V. The 
Vd can be adjusted between 0.1 V and 0.5 V to achieve the optimal result. The effect of Vg and Vd on RTN traps 
has also been studied  previously46,51. Typically, an increase in Vg will decrease the capture time and increase the 
emission time with a given Vd and the exact relationship being highly device dependant. For Vd variation with 
a given Vg, an increase in Vd will cause a decrease in emission time and an increase in capture  time52, again with 
the exact relationship being highly device dependant. For low power applications it is advisable to use the lowest 
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possible value for Vg and Vd as this will give the lowest current flow through the device, thereby reducing power 
consumption. It has also been reported that a low Vg will give the largest single trap impact on the Id within the 
device, making extraction of the RTN signal easier.
We now compare our design with some of the prominent TRNG designs previously proposed. The key fig-
ures for the discussed designs are shown in Table 3. Firstly, we look at the original RTN based TRNG proposed 
by Brederlow et al.37 The key improvements over this design include removing the post-processing circuit and 
thereby increasing design efficiency. As we use a much broader range of RTN types, it reduces the required size 
of device array.
The design of Figliolia et al.53 does have potentially greater generation rate, but is significantly more complex 
and requires a lot more design area when implemented onto an IC. Also, Figliolia’s design was not tested using 
the DIEHARD or NIST test suite, so the randomness of the generated bitstream is not verified.
Chen et al.40 proposed a design that can either offer comparable or better bitrate than our design depending 
upon the type of device used and the level of confidence in the security that is required. At a similar security 
confidence, the bitrate will be similar to ours, if the RS232 limitation is removed and a single entropy source 
is utilised. Our design offers improvements over Chen’s design in areas of design complexity and efficiency of 
entropy extraction as we utilise more types of RTN. Chen’s design is only tested in a simulated environment, 
rather than with a practical circuit, so that there is more uncertainty in the real-world performance of their 
design when compared to ours.
The design by Mohanty et al.39 improves the efficiency when compared to other previous RTN based designs. 
Our proposed design further improves the efficiency. Mohanty removes the need for post-processing circuits 
through a balancing scheme. We also remove the post-processing circuits by using RTN to sample an oscillator. 
For multi-level RTN, Mohanty’s proposed design extracts the entropy from the slowest trap, whereas our design 
extracts the entropy from all RTN events. This improved entropy extraction is the primary reason why our design 
generates bits at a significantly higher rate as compared with Mohanty’s design.
Next, we compare our design with some of the most prominent non-RTN based TRNGs. The metastability 
based TRNG proposed by Sanu et al.15 can achieve bitrates higher than any of the RTN based TRNGs, but it is 
significantly more complex and requires tuning and processing circuits, making it suit high performance, high 
power applications. On the other hand, the simplicity and low power of our design fits better for applications 
such as remote IoT sensors or ID cards.
Matsumoto et al.54 proposed a design based on tunnelling in SiN devices. Its bitrate is lower than the bitrate 
of our design without the RS232 limitation and its area is even larger than that of Sanu et al.15. Matsumoto also 
mentions that the proposed design only works well with a specific type of device, whereas our CMOS-based 
design does not have this limitation.
The design proposed by Jiang et al.33 is based on the write time of memristors. Jiang’s design can achieve a 
bitrate that is comparable with our design when limited by the RS232 and would be significantly slower than 
our design with that limitation removed. Their design has a similar level of complexity as ours. Our design has 
the advantage that it is based on CMOS technologies, making it readily implementable.
In conclusion, we present an experimentally verified TRNG design, based on the trap event timing of multi-
level RTN, using standard CMOS technology. The proposed design makes use of a new edge-to-pulse entropy 
extraction technique, which enables us to utilise multi-level RTN, abnormal RTN as well as traditional two level 
RTN, thereby improving on device selectivity and output bitrate. The design also introduces a new processing 
technique, which removes the need for any post-processing, the need for complicated tuning circuits for sam-
pling frequency, as well as increasing resistance to oversampling attacks. The randomness of the proposed TRNG 
is verified by the 15 NIST Special Publication 800-22 randomness tests as well as the DIEHARD randomness 
tests. The proposed design also shows resilience against machine learning attacks. Selection of key parameters 
is discussed for optimising TRNG performance in terms of output bitrate and design complexity for different 
user requirements. The novel improvements presented in this work pave the way for a TRNG suitable for the low 
power, low area, and low-cost applications that are key requirements of IoT edge units.
Table 3.  Comparison with Other TRNGs.  a Speed when limited by RS232 communication.
TRNG Entropy source Generation rate Design area Post processing Verification
This work Random telegraph noise 19.2 kbits/sa N/A None Passes NIST and DIE-HARD
Sanu  201515 Metastability of inverters 162.5 Mbit/s 1088 μm2 XOR decorrelator and BIW extractor Passes NIST
Figliolia  201553 RTN with sigma delta converter 1–25 Mbit/s 2200 μm
2 None N/A
Matsumoto  200854 Tunnelling in SiN device 0.3 Mbit/s 1200 μm2 None Passes FIPS 140-2
Brederlow  200637 Random telegraph noise 200 kbits/s 0.009 mm2 Von Neumann Passes NIST
Chen  201540 Random telegraph noise 0.25–5 Mbits/s N/A Von Neumann or bit truncation Passes NIST
Jiang  201733 Memristor write time 6 kbits/s N/A None Passes NIST with reduced α value
Mohanty  201739 Random telegraph noise 3 bits/s N/A None Passes NIST
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Methods
Device information. The characterisation and TRNG testing was performed using both 22 nm FinFET 
NMOS devices provided by imec and 28 nm high-k metal gate PMOS devices provided by CSR. For the 22 nm 
devices the channel length was 28 nm and the width was 90 nm. For the 28 nm devices the channel length was 
27 nm and the width was 90 nm.
Device characterisation. All device characterisation was performed with a Keysight B1500 semiconduc-
tor analyser. An SMU was used to measure I–V signals and 2 WGFMU units were used to measure the constant 
Vg RTN. During TRNG operation, an Agilent Infiniium MSO8104A oscilloscope was used to observe the raw 
amplified RTN signal, as well as signals from several key points within the edge-to-pulse unit.
TRNG proof of concept operation. For the proof of concept circuit, supply voltages were applied with 
Keysight E3632A DC power supplies, Id current with RTN events was amplified using a Femto DHPCA-100 
amplifier, and a Xilinx Spartan 3 FPGA development board was used. The entropy source device was probed on 
a sample silicon wafer using a Cascade Summit probe station. FPGA programming was performed in the ISE 
design suite using a combination of custom and conventional VHDL blocks assembled in the visual program-
ming environment. Videos of the TRNG proof of concept circuit in operation are available.
NIST test suite testing. For each of the 15 NIST tests the recommended bitstream length and number of 
tested blocks was used, as well as any other recommended parameters specific for each test (see Supplementary 
Information for specific values). The significance value selected was 0.01, which is recommended in the NIST 
user manual. The test suite was run on a Linux machine running the Red Hat enterprise operation system. For 
the NIST results relating to the operation of the proof of concept circuit the bitstreams are saved onto the analysis 
PC after being transmitted from the FPGA in the form of a “.txt” file. For the NIST results relating to the oscil-
lator parameter testing, the bitstreams are gained from Matlab simulations of the TRNG and are exported from 
Matlab into “.txt” files which are then tested in the NIST test suite on the Linux machine.
DIEHARD tests. As the original version of the DIEHARD test suite is not readily available anymore, we 
made use of the Dieharder test suite constructed by Robert G.  Brown47 for Duke University, which contains 
accurate reconstructions of each of the original DIEHARD tests. To perform the DIEHARD tests the binary 
bitstreams used for the NIST test were converted to a stream of 32-bit unsigned integers, as required by the 
“202” generator setting in the Dieharder test suite. 8 Mb of data was used for testing in the Dieharder suite. The 
length of the bitstreams used for each test were determined by the guidelines provided with the Dieharder test 
suite. The random excursions and random excursions variant tests were not included in the Dieharder test suite, 
however the tests are identical to the tests with the same name in the NIST test suite, so the NIST test results are 
shown. The Monkey tests (OPSO, OQSO and DNA) are listed as being unreliable so they were not used for the 
DIEHARD testing.
LSTM neural network. The construction of the LSTM neural network was guided by the early works that 
used machine learning to try to crack random number  generators48,55,56. Based on the principles outlined in these 
previous works, our LSTM network was constructed with an LSTM layer of 256 hidden units and a single hid-
den layer, connected to a fully connected layer. The training was performed with 1 million bits over 20 epochs. 
100,000 predicted bits were generated and tested against 100,000 bits from the TRNG and the hamming distance 
between them was calculated. The hamming distance achieved was 0.4981.
TRNG simulations for parameter testing. For the TRNG simulations that were used for exploration of 
the various oscillator parameters, Matlab was used to create and run the simulations. The RTN model within the 
simulated TRNG utilises the widely used model based on a first order Markov chain reported in  reference57. The 
values used for the model input parameters are based on the values extracted from experimental characterisa-
tion of real transistors. The rest of the TRNG is simulated using Matlab script to generate the required oscillator 
signal and output bits from sampling the oscillator signal with the timing of the simulated RTN events.
 Data availability
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